aws re: Invent

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Scaling IAM: Advanced administration and delegation patterns

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Agenda

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Challenges

- Scaling challenges
- Managing access
- Securing identities



Solution

- Delegation strategies
- Centralizing and automating IAM management
- Implementing permissions guardrails
- Permissions management tools



Assessing your IAM posture

- Where are you starting from?
- Tying it all together



Wrap up

- Discussion
- Further reading material

Permissions to resources in one account





Central Security Team

More realistic scenario

| aws | AWS Cloud | | |
|-----|----------------------------------|-------------|-----------|
| | \Box_0^{\triangle} AWS account | | |
| | | × | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | × | |
| | | × | |
| | | ✓ ✓ × | |
| | Users & groups | Permissions | Resources |
| L | | | |



Central Security Team

A common customer scenario



Central Security Team

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Central team managing access



Everyone needs to ask me for IAM permissions



Central Security Team

Central team becomes a bottleneck



Centralized IAM Approach

Security team creates and deploys all IAM roles/policies; builders have no access to IAM



Gated IAM Approach

Builders codify the IAM roles and policies, but need Security to approve and deploy



Challenges



Solution



Path to self-service



Productized approach to IAM

Centralize IAM Management with IdC

- Centrally manage users & groups
- Centrally manage permissions

Automate

- Machine identity management
- Resource creation
- Account delivery with defined feature set

Delegation

- Role vending
- Policy validation

Security controls

- Permissions guardrails
- Base set of policies

Delegation

What do we mean by delegation?

Builder Bob



aws

I need a role to run my application! Security Susan



Create it yourself!

Permissions boundaries

Apply permissions boundaries to the IAM roles created by developers, rather than to the developers themselves

Group your **permissions boundaries into categories** that fit the scope of similar application functions (such as system automation and analytics) Permissions boundary: Defined by the administrator Effective permissions for IAM principals that are created by the employee

IAM permissions policy: Defined by the employee



Without permissions boundaries



With permissions boundaries



* But only if a permissions boundary is attached

Permissions boundary walkthrough

Account Admin Step 1: Create the permissions boundary only allowing certain AWS services (CompanyBoundary)

```
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [
{
    "Sid": "ServiceBoundaries",
    "Effect": "Allow",
    "Action": [
        "s3:*",
        "cloudwatch:*",
        "ec2:*"
    ],
    "Resource": "*"
}
```

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Permissions boundary walkthrough

Account Admin Step 2: Allow role creation, but only if CompanyBoundary is specified. Attach permission policy to delegated IAM Admin principal

```
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [
      "Sid": "SetPermissionsBoundary",
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": [
        "iam:CreateRole",
        "iam:AttachRolePolicy",
         "iam:DetachRolePolicy"
     ],
      "Resource": "*",
      "Condition": {
        "StringEquals": {
         "iam:PermissionsBoundary": "arn:aws:iam::123456789012:policy/CompanyBoundaries"
   },
      "Sid": "CreateAndEditPermissionsPolicy",
      "Effect": "Deny",
     "Action": [
         "iam:CreatePolicy",
         "iam:CreatePolicyVersion",
         "iam:DeletePolicyVersion"
      ],
     "Resource": "arn:aws:iam::123456789012:policy/AppPolicies/*"
```

{

Delegated approach

Builders codify the IAM roles/policies. Security team uses automated policy validation to perform the security checks that were previously manual



CI/CD pattern

Builder Bob



Security Susan



AWS Security blog: Validate IAM policies in CloudFormation templates using IAM Access Analyzer





API to create roles pattern



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CI/CD vs API

Controls in CI/CD Pipeline

Pros:

- AWS offered tooling
- Get started quickly
- Backwards compatible with existing tooling

Cons:

- Difficult to make consistent at scale
- Difficult to ensure all pipelines are covered

API to create roles

Pros:

- Limit scope for CreateRole* permission (API)
- Centralized evaluation
- Flexibility on responding to failed policy checks/validations via API response

Cons:

Custom built



While maintaining security controls



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AWS IAM policy

types

Impact radius Intent Guardrail vs. Grant





AWS IAM policy

types

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Impact radius Intent Guardrail vs. Grant Should be used by Central team

Organization/OU/Account level



Service control policies (SCPs)

CENTRALLY CREATE AND APPLY PREVENTIVE GUARDRAILS FOR YOUR ORGANIZATION

Define maximum available permissions of the IAM principals for all accounts in your organization

Can be applied to organization root, OUs, or member accounts

Supports delegated administration



Resource control policies (RCPs)

CENTRALLY CREATE AND APPLY PREVENTIVE GUARDRAILS FOR YOUR ORGANIZATION

Define uniform access controls on resources across your AWS environment

Can be applied to organization root, OUs, or member accounts

Supports delegated administration

RCPs are only supported with few services today



Declarative policies for EC2

DECLARE AND ENFORCE DESIRED CONFIGURATION FOR A GIVEN AWS SERVICE

Once attached, the configuration is always maintained when EC2 adds new features or APIs

Can be applied to organization root, OUs, or member accounts

Examples:

- EC2 image block public access
- Snapshot block public access
- VPC block public access



Access management strategy

Data perimeter

Coarse-grained controls



What is a data perimeter?



Data perimeter controls

| Perimeter | Intent / Control Objective | Applied on | Using | Primary IAM feature |
|-----------|--|--|---------------------|--|
| | Only trusted identities can access my resources | Resources | RCP | aws:PrincipalOrgID aws:PrincipalIsAWSService |
| identity | Only trusted identities are allowed from my network | Network | VPC endpoint policy | aws:PrincipalOrgID aws:PrincipalIsAWSService |
| Decourse | My identities can access only trusted resources | Applied onUsingPrimary IAM featuresesourcesResourcesRCPaws:PrincipalOrgH aws:PrincipalOrgH aws:PrincipalOrgH aws:PrincipalOrgH aws:PrincipalOrgH aws:PrincipalOrgH aws:PrincipalOrgH | aws:ResourceOrgID | |
| Resource | Only trusted resources can be accessed from my network | | aws:ResourceOrgID | |
| | My identities can access resources only from expected networks | Identities | SCP | aws:Sourcelp aws:SourceVpc/aws:SourceVpce aws:ViaAWSService |
| Network | My resources can only be accessed from expected networks | Resources | RCP | aws:Sourcelp aws:SourceVpc/aws:SourceVpce aws:ViaAWSService aws:PrincipalIsAWSService |

Mitigating security risks with data perimeter controls

Managing root users in AWS Organizations

Central management for root access

PROVIDES CUSTOMERS WITH A SIMPLIFIED WAY TO MANAGE, SECURE, AND CONTROL HIGHLY PRIVILEGED ACCESS TO THEIR AWS MEMBER ACCOUNTS

Simplify audit and compliance

Easily manage root credentials

Tightly scoped privileged access

IAM > Root access management

Root access management Info

Centralize root access for your member accounts Info

You can delete root credentials for member accounts and perform privileged actions from the management or delegated account. Learn more about centralizing root access [

Improved security

You can delete root user credentials for member accounts and eliminate the need for managing long term root user credentials and associated multi-factor authentication (MFA) devices.

| C | |
|---|--|

Better compliance

You can prove root credential non existence for your audit and compliance needs, proving your root user is secured across your member accounts.

Total control

You will have the control to block or allow root password recovery for your passwordless member accounts.

Access Analysis with IAM Access Analyzer

EXTERNAL AND UNUSED ACCESS ANALYSIS

The unused access analyzing tool can be **enabled** in your account or with Organizations

Continually **monitors and reviews** access activity across all IAM roles and users

Identifies unused **roles**, unused user **credentials**, and unused **permissions**

Generates findings for you to review over-permissive IAM roles and users

Review dashboard to identify accounts that need attention

Customers use action last accessed by individual roles for no additional charge; optionally, customers use this **paid offering** for continual monitoring and centralized review capabilities

Unused access analysis – Analyzer scoping

Specific accounts – using account ID Specific IAM principals – using principal tags

How does it help?

Focus unused access analysis on important AWS accounts and IAM principals
 "Prioritized" unused access findings based on specific accounts and principals
 Optimize the cost for unused access analysis

Assessing your IAM posture

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Identity and Access Management (IAM)

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Q Search

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Q Search IAM

Dashboard

aws

Access management

User groups

Users

Roles

Policies

Identity providers

Account settings

Access reports

Access Analyzer

External access

Unused access

Analyzer settings

Credential report

Organization activity

Service control policies

Resource control policies New

Related consoles

aws

IAM Identity Center

| Dashboard | | | | |
|------------------------------------|---------------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------------|----------------------|
| M Dashboa | rd | | | |
| IAM resource | s | | | |
| Resources in this A | WS Account | | | |
| 🔥 You are app | roaching your quota of a | vailable IAM resources. Le | earn more | |
| User groups | Users | Roles | Policies | Identity provid |
| | 4583 | 4898 | | |
| 1 | | | 70 | 1 |
| What's new ^{[2} | 3 | | | Vi |
| Updates for feature | es in IAM | | | |
| AWS IAM Access | Analyzer now offers polic | y checks for public and cri | tical resource access. 3 mo | nths ago |
| AWS IAM Access | Analyzer now offers reco | mmendations to refine un | used access. 3 months ago | |
| AWS Launches C | Console-based Bulk Policy | Migration for Billing and C | Cost Management Console | Access. 3 months ago |
| IAM Roles Anyw | here now supports modify | ying the mapping of certifi | icate attributes. 5 months a | go |
| | | N/ more | | |

Not good!

A lot of IAM users

Long-lived credentials such as access keys

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Not good!

Overly-permissive permissions

Not good!

External access on

| CloudTrail $	imes$ | CloudTrail > Event history | | | | | |
|---|--|---------------------------------------|-----------|-------------------|--------------------------|---------------------|
| Dashboard Event history Insights | Event history (1/5) info Event history shows you the last 90 days of manag Lookup attributes | jement events. | | C | Download events v | Create Athena table |
| Lake | User name | ▼ Q. root | | X 📰 Filter by | date and time | < 1 2 > 💿 |
| Dashboard Query | Event name | Event time | User name | Event source | Resource type | Resource name |
| Event data stores | ListRolePolicies | September 09, 2024, 11:45:47 (UTC-04: | root | iam.amazonaws.com | - | - |
| Integrations | ListInstanceProfilesForRole | September 09, 2024, 11:45:47 (UTC-04: | root | iam.amazonaws.com | - | - |
| raits | ListInstanceProfilesForRole | September 09, 2024, 11:45:47 (UTC-04: | root | iam.amazonaws.com | - | - |
| ettings | ListRolePolicies | September 09, 2024, 11:45:46 (UTC-04: | root | iam.amazonaws.com | - | - |
| | ListAttachedRolePolicies | September 09, 2024, 11:45:46 (UTC-04: | root | iam.amazonaws.com | - | - |
| ricing 🖸 | DeleteRole | September 09, 2024, 11:45:46 (UTC-04: | root | iam.amazonaws.com | AWS::IAM::Role | 1130 |
| ocumentation 🖸 | ListRolePolicies | September 09, 2024, 11:45:45 (UTC-04: | root | iam.amazonaws.com | - | - |
| AQs 🖸 | DeleteRolePolicy | September 09, 2024, 11:45:45 (UTC-04: | root | iam.amazonaws.com | AWS::IAM::Policy, AWS: | ModivCareTest, 113 |
| | GetRole | September 09, 2024, 11:45:32 (UTC-04: | root | iam.amazonaws.com | - | - |
| | GetRole | September 09, 2024, 11:45:32 (UTC-04: | root | iam.amazonaws.com | - | - |
| | GetRole | September 09, 2024, 11:45:32 (UTC-04: | root | iam.amazonaws.com | - | - |
| | GetRole | September 09, 2024, 11:45:32 (UTC-04: | root | iam.amazonaws.com | - | - |

Not good!

Root user usage

 $\overline{}$

1 / 5 events selected

| Identity and Access < | IAM > Users > 1318 | | | | |
|---------------------------------------|--|---|---------------------------------|--|--|
| Management (IAM) | 1318 Info | | | Delete | |
| Q Search IAM | Summary | | | | |
| Dashboard | ARN arn:aws:iam:: :user/1318 | Console access Disabled | | Access key 1 I - Active Access key 1 I - Active Access key 1 I - Active | |
| Access management | Created | Last console sign-in | | Access key 2 | |
| User groups | June 09, 2022, 00:27 (UTC-04:00) | - | | Create access key | |
| Users | | | | | |
| Roles | | | | | |
| Policies | Permissions Groups Tags Security | credentials Access Advisor | | | |
| Identity providers | | | | | |
| Account settings | Console sign-in | | | Enable console access | |
| Access reports | Console sign-in link | | Console password | | |
| Access Analyzer | https:// signin.aws.amazon.com/conso | le | Not enabled | | |
| External access | | | | | |
| Unused access | | | | | |
| Analyzer settings | Multi-factor authentication (MFA) (0) | | | Remove Resync Assign MFA device | |
| Credential report | Use MFA to increase the security of your AWS environment | t. Signing in with MFA requires an auth | entication code from an MFA dev | vice. Each user can have a maximum of 8 MFA devices | |
| Organization activity | assigned. Learn more | | | | |
| Service control policies | Туре | lentifier | Certifications | Created on | |
| Resource control policies New | No MFA devices. Assign an MFA device to improve the security of your AWS environment | | | | |
| | Assign MFA device | | | | |
| Related consoles | | | | | |
| IAM Identity Center 🖸 | | | | | |

Not good!

Access keys are not rotated

No MFA

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| Identity and Access $	imes$ | Organization activity |
|--|--|
| Q Search IAM | |
| Dashboard | Organization structure Select an organizational unit (OU) or account to view its service activity. Recent activity usually appears within 4 hours. Data is stored for a maximum of 365 days. Learn more C Q. Search by name, email, account ID or OU ID. |
| Access management User groups | Organizational structure |
| Users Roles | ▼ C₂ Root |
| Policies Identity providers | Production |
| Account settings | Sandbox |
| Access Analyzer | ► 🗅 Security |
| Unused access | |
| Credential report Organization activity | |

| aws iii Services Q Search | | [Option+S] | | | D. 4 | 0 0 | Global 🔻 😒 | SwaraGandhi 🔻 |
|---------------------------|--|--|---|---------------------------------------|----------------|---------------|-------------|---------------|
| Q Search IAM | IAM > Roles | | | | | | E | 0 |
| Dashboard | Roles (4889) Info An IAM TOLE IS an Identity you can create that ha | s specific permissions with credentials th | at are valid for short durations. Roles can b | e assumed by entities that you trust. | G | Delete | Create role | 0 |
| • Access management | Q. Search | | | | < 1 2 3 | 4567 | 245 > (9) | |
| User groups | | | | | | | | |
| Users | Role name | Path | | | ARN ♥ | Max CLI/API 1 | Zast activi | ty |
| Roles | <u> </u> | / | | 2 years ago | am:aws:lam::0 | 1 hour | - | |
| Policies | 114 | / | - | 2 years ago | arn:aws:lam::0 | 1 hour | - | |

Not good!

Multiple IAM resources in AWS Management account

Elements of scaling

Resources

Validate IAM policies in CloudFormation templates using IAM Access Analyzer

AWS CloudFormation policy validator

AWS IAM Access Analyzer custom policy check samples

Data Perimeters landing page

Thank you!

Please complete the session survey in the mobile app

Swara Gandhi in linkedin.com/in/swaragandhi ganswara@amazon.com Jeremy Ware in linkedin.com/in/jeremyware104/ jmware@amazon.com

