American Foreign Policy Interests: The Journal of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy
Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/uafp20

The Militarization of U.S. Foreign Policy

Karl W. Eikenberry

Version of record first published: 29 Jan 2013.

To cite this article: Karl W. Eikenberry (2013): The Militarization of U.S. Foreign Policy, American Foreign Policy Interests: The Journal of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy, 35:1, 1-8

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10803920.2013.757952

American Foreign Policy Interests, 35:1–8, 2013

ISSN: 1080-3920 print/1533-2128 online
DOI: 10.1080/10803920.2013.757952

The Militarization of U.S. Foreign Policy

Karl W. Eikenberry

ABSTRACT This article draws from the annual lecture in "U.S. Security in the 21st Century Series," sponsored by the National Committee on American Foreign Policy; it was delivered by the author on September 27, 2012, in New York City. It explores the U.S. military's role in the making of American foreign policy by examining the degree of influence, identifying reasons why policy formulation may be imbalanced, and speculating on possible long-term consequences of excessive reliance on military power. Central to the arguments presented is the erosion of appropriate levels of executive, congressional, and media oversight of the American armed forces.

KEYWORDS All-Volunteer Force; Congress; conscript force; Department of Defense; Department of State; media; U.S. military

Karl W. Eikenberry is the William J. Perry Fellow in International Security at the Stanford University Center for International Security and Cooperation. He served as the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan from May 2009 until July 2011 and had a 35-year career in the United States Army, retiring with the rank of lieutenant general. His military assignments included postings with mechanized, light, airborne, and ranger infantry units in the continental United States, Hawaii, Korea, Italy, and Afghanistan as the Commander of the American-led Coalition forces from 2005–2007. He is a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, has earned master's degrees from Harvard University in East Asian Studies and Stanford University in Political Science, was awarded an Interpreter's Certificate in Mandarin Chinese from the British Foreign Commonwealth Office, and earned an advanced degree in Chinese History from Nanjing University.

INTRODUCTION

Thank you, George [Schwab] for your very kind words, and I thank all of you for being here. I have cherished my association with the National Committee on American Foreign Policy over the years. I have been impressed with your superb "Track II" discussions and the analytical work your committee has done on so many critical foreign policy issues, ranging from Northern Ireland, to the Middle East, to the Caspian Sea, to the Taiwan Strait, to the Korean Peninsula.

It is a special honor to have been selected to deliver the annual lecture in the Committee's U.S. Security in the 21st Century Series. I am excited about the potential for this series and, in particular, about plans to examine emerging critical aspects of national security such as cyberdefense and cyberwarfare.

The theme of my talk this evening is the role of our nation's military in the development and implementation of American foreign policy. I have divided my remarks into three parts:

First—addressing the question: "Is our military's role in the construct and delivery of a balanced foreign policy appropriately scaled?"

Second—offering thoughts that might explain—if its role is outsized—why this might be the case.

And, third—briefly speculating on the possible long-term consequences of American foreign policy being imbalanced—that is, excessively reliant on military power.

THE EXTENT OF OUR MILITARY'S ROLE IN FOREIGN POLICY

Let's begin with the question: "What is the extent of our military's role in foreign policy?" Here, I am referring to both the shaping of policy and the application of military tools. Harvard's Joe Nye famously developed the formulation of three types of power, defined as the ability to shape others' behavior to one's own benefit.[1] These types of power are coercive, persuasive, and attractive or "soft" power. When speaking of military influence in foreign policy, I am talking about its manifestation of coercive power—although later in my remarks I will note that the Department of Defense has, over the years, expanded its activities to encompass areas more traditionally associated with persuasive and soft power as well. How might we quantify the role and influence of the military in foreign policy? I will offer three measures.

First, the evidence garnered from the history of conflict-related military deployments. There have been over 330 such deployments since 1798, although about half of these were after World War II when the United States had become a superpower with global security interests. If we look just at the periods between 1946 and 1973, and from 1973 to the present, the contrast is sharp. In the earlier period, the United States relied on a conscript force; whereas, during the latter, it utilized an All-Volunteer Force. I will revisit why choosing to delineate between the draft and All-Volunteer Force periods might be relevant and explanatory. Nineteen overseas military deployments occurred during the twenty-seven-year draft period (again, 1946 to 1973) versus more than 144 military deployments to date during the subsequent thirty-nine-year course of the All-Volunteer Force. This translates into an All-Volunteer Force deployments per annum ratio five times higher than that of the draft force deployment ratio. What can be said is the rate of overseas conflict-related military deployments since the mid-1970s has been at unprecedented levels for the United States, and the rate has actually risen over the last two decades. The increased use of coercive power by our country in recent times is an empirical fact.

A second measure involves the heavily unbalanced ratio of the level of resources available to the military versus those offered to the diplomatic and development sides of foreign policy. Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has been quoted often for his observations that the U.S. military has more musicians in its marching bands than the State Department has diplomats[2]—defined as Foreign Service Officers of which there are currently some 6,600. Whether this remark is correct or not, we do know that one U.S. Navy carrier battle group, of which we can deploy ten, has more than 6,600 sailors assigned to it. The capacity, in terms of personnel, communications, logistics, transportation, organizational capability, and discretionary funds that our military has at its disposal is breathtaking when compared to that of the civilian component of the foreign policy establishment. Consider United States Africa Command, which was established in 2008 and is based in Stuttgart, Germany. Commanded by a four-star general, it has some 1,500 personnel assigned to its headquarters. The Department of State's analog, the Bureau of African Affairs in Washington, D.C., by comparison, has about 180 assigned to its staff. To offer another example, in a recent study, the General Accounting Office found that as of October 2011, 28 percent of overseas Foreign Service positions were either vacant or filled by "upstretch candidates," which are officers serving in positions above their grades.[3] This statistic has not changed since 2008. Could you imagine the Department of Defense and Congress being content with a similar state of affairs for the U.S. military? Numbers, capacity, resources, and agility matter. In this complex world of endless emergencies and crises, our government turns to those who offer an immediate response. Our Department of Defense is called upon often, simply because it has the apparent capacity to get things done, regardless of appropriateness or consideration of precedence.

When I transitioned from fatigues to pinstripes in 2009 and assumed the post as Chief of Mission of the American Embassy in Kabul, the dominant influence of our military was brought home to me in spades. The civilian–military partnership was a fact in Afghanistan, but it was one between a flyweight and heavyweight boxer. Of course, Afghanistan is a combat zone and perhaps not a good example. I spoke frequently, however, with my fellow ambassadors from around the globe, and they generally expressed distress at the increasing influence of our defense establishment in foreign policy. One candidly said, "If I want a meeting with the head of state of the country to which I am assigned, I give the

regional U.S. combatant commander a call." Military diplomacy, an important instrument in the foreign policy tool kit, is too often eclipsing State Department-led diplomacy. This disparity comes with negative long-term consequences.

EXPLANATORY FACTORS

If our foreign policy has been increasingly influenced by the military—and I recognize some or maybe all of you may disagree with this proposition, why might this be the case? There are four possible explanations.

First, our nation's particular historical circumstances may contribute to the frequent use of military resources abroad. Whereas America has been the sole global military superpower since the end of the cold war, the same is not true in regard to the economic domain. Today's world is militarily unipolar and economically multipolar. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States gained and has since maintained, a huge comparative advantage in the use of coercive power (versus economic and soft power). Military force is now often the most cost-effective instrument of American national power. Such a hypothesis is speculative but is also consistent with historical theories of change in world politics—such as those of Paul Kennedy[4] and Robert Gilpin,[5] who posit that economically declining hegemonic powers often possess an overreaching military influence to preserve global systems whose maintenance is considered a matter of vital prestige. Gilpin framed the challenge of the dominant state in the international system well when he stated:

> To solve the fundamental problem . . . the balancing of commitments and resources. The . . . three-way struggle over priorities (protection, consumption, and investment) produces a profound dilemma for society. If it suppresses consumption, the consequence can be severe internal social tensions and class conflict. . . . If the society neglects to pay the costs of defense, external weakness will inevitably lead to its defeat by rising powers. If the society fails to save and reinvest a sufficient fraction of its surplus wealth in industry and agriculture [and I would add education, research & development, and infrastructure], the economic basis of the society and its capacity to sustain either consumption or protection will decline.[6]

It is possible, at this point on America's trajectory that, as the dominant global power, we are focused on maintaining the status quo, and compelled by domestic political imperatives to place a premium on protection (that is, security) and consumption rather than to investment. If so, we are most likely on an unsustainable path.

The second explanation is that as international security problems have become complex—or more interdisciplinary—our military has been increasingly called upon to facilitate, organize, and even lead interagency responses. U.S. strategic challenges go far beyond state actors such as North Korea, Iran, or China. We live in a world threatened by borderless terrorism, criminal and narcotrafficking activities, pandemic outbreaks, and cyberattacks. Who better to call upon than a well-resourced, superbly organized, agile, flexible, can-do organization, such as the U.S. military? Its current budget comprises over 40 percent of the world's military spending and exceeds the combined defense expenditures of the next fourteen nations. Our military has become Thor's magnificent hammer making a growing number of foreign policy problems appear to be simply nails to our civilian leadership. Our military has convening power, and it is used even more frequently now than ever before.

A third explanation is that with the transition from a conscript to a volunteer force, the republic's political ownership of our armed forces has significantly eroded. This phenomenon opened the door to military adventurism. As noted earlier, the record shows that after the draft was terminated, military conflict-related deployments increased in frequency fivefold. Princeton professor Julian Zelizer wrote in his excellent work, *The Arsenal of Democracy*: "By eliminating the draft, [President] Nixon weakened the most immediate connection that existed between the national security state and average citizens."[7] If so, why might more frequent military deployments have followed? Let's consider the two post-1973 All-Volunteer Force interventions unique in breadth and scope: Afghanistan and Iraq II. Together they are: the longest in duration of any American war (the Afghanistan conflict alone enjoys this distinction); the seventh most lethal American conflict measured in fatalities; second in fatalities (after the Mexican-American War) of those conflicts fought entirely with volunteer forces; and second only to World War II in expense (and perhaps yet to become the most costly armed intervention in U.S. history). A reasonable argument can be made that the absence of those domestic political constraints inherent in a draft force

may have freed otherwise cautious U.S. government decision makers to carry out large-scale extended military operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan. When I have spoken on this topic to various audiences around the country, I ask: "If we had a conscripted military good enough to accomplish the same missions assigned our current volunteer forces (admittedly a bold assumption), would the U.S. have invaded Iraq in 2003 and had 100,000 troops stationed in Afghanistan one decade after 9-11?" Never more than one or two participants offer an affirmative response. The fact is that with well-resourced and capable volunteers supplemented by generally willing reservists, America's politicians have not faced significant organized domestic grassroots opposition to unpopular conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, quite unlike the Vietnam War experience. Even less politically problematic has been ordering America's volunteer legions into harm's way for countless brushfire wars and policing actions. The framers of the U.S. Constitution, most notably James Madison, believed that Congress—the voice of the people in this instance—should have extensive authority to take the country to war, and this decree is so codified in Article 1, Section 8, paragraph 11. Congress, however, has only exercised its constitutional prerogative to declare war five times in America's history. Its reassertion of congressional war-making authority in the 1973 War Powers Resolution has been ignored by every president since enactment. Congress has even fewer incentives under the All-Volunteer Force model to assert its constitutional responsibilities against the Executive, especially in the preliminary and initial stages of a military intervention. Without sizable numbers of organized constituents fretting about the personal and family costs of a conflict, the legislators' preferred strategy is to discount the future and to avoid casting a vote against waging war during the flag-waving stage of a crisis. Most members of Congress, always with an eye on reelection, will give pause before contesting strong Executive appeals to commit forces abroad in the stated defense of the national interest. The Gates Commission, named after former Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates and charged by President Nixon to examine the feasibility of an All-Volunteer Force, concluded that adoption of an All-Volunteer Force would: "actually increase democratic participation in decisions concerning the use of military force."[8] The Commission further contended, in part, that: "If tax increases are needed or military spending claims priority over other public spending, a broad public debate is likely. Recent history suggests that increased taxes generate far more public discussion than increased draft calls."[9] This prediction proved inaccurate for several reasons. The first is a matter of scale. U.S. defense outlays today, although huge in absolute terms, consume a much smaller percentage of total federal spending than in 1970 when the Gates Commission report was published. In 1968 (the height of the Vietnam War), defense spending accounted for 45.1 percent of federal outlays, whereas in 2008 (the year marking the maximum combined level of effort in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars) defense spending was only 19.9 percent of the federal budget. This percentage was exceeded by Health and Human Services (23.5 percent), Social Security (21.7 percent), and almost equaled by Treasury's debt financing (18.4 percent). In 1968, defense spending stood at 9.4 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), whereas it comprised 4.6 percent in 2008.[10] Unlike the era of the Gates Commission, advocates of robust military spending now argue that defense should be largely immune from the ongoing budget debates. They emphasize that increasingly costly entitlement programs and mounting interest payments on our national debt are the real deficit threats.

The second is a matter of context. At least for now, our nation's unprecedented extended deficit spending spree has removed any serious discussion about current expenditure levels from the public agenda. Gates, who served as a Secretary of Defense under the fiscally conservative President Dwight Eisenhower, could never have imagined our current state of affairs. With U.S. federal deficits as a percentage of GDP reaching levels not experienced since the immediate aftermath of World War II, the quest for budget discipline that Gates took as a given has been all but abandoned. The problem was made more acute during the course of the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts as the Bush administration, supported by Congress, actually reduced taxes and made housing credit more plentiful. American citizens could be forgiven for making no connection between their individual tax payments and the real cost of two distant wars.

The third reason is structural. The extraordinary and unprecedented use of civilian contractors in conflict zones has obscured the actual price of war from

the American people who tend to measure costs in number of troops deployed. The use of contractors on battlefields has proliferated during the first decade of the twenty-first century. It is estimated that between 2007 and 2011, on average, contractors outnumbered deployed military personnel in both Iraq and Afghanistan. This ratio represents a massive increase when compared with Operation Desert Storm in 1991 when only about 4,000 were employed. Of course, the Department of Defense could also employ numerous contractors to augment a conscript force. However, the point is that their large-scale use in support of our volunteer armed forces not only conceals the real scope of conflict from the American people, but also reduces pressure on the military's leadership either to recommend strategies that can be implemented by the extant force or alternatively to request a politically problematic large expansion of the All-Volunteer Force. Thus, closing out the discussion of political ownership of our armed forces, we might reasonably conclude that the establishment of the All-Volunteer Force enabled the fielding of the most lethal and dominant military in world history but also created the conditions for more frequent employment of other forms of national power.

A fourth and final explanation for the expanding role of the defense establishment in foreign affairs might be that the external oversight and the imposed accountability that has traditionally placed boundaries on the areas of military influence have gradually atrophied. These facts are perhaps consequences of the move to the All-Volunteer Force. The two most important external sources of imposed accountability on the American military are Congress and the media. Neither has performed with distinction in recent decades.

First, consider Congress. The number of serving members of Congress with military experience has decreased significantly since the end of conscription in 1973. In the 91st Congress (1969–1971), 398 members had served in the military; in the current 112th Congress (2011–2013), only 118 have served. This discrepancy represents a drop from over 73 percent to about 22 percent.[11] In addition, very few members of Congress actually have sons and daughters serving in the Armed Forces. With the attendant loss of expertise, family ties, and perhaps interest, Congress appears less inclined to rigorously challenge senior military officers' advice and question their management practices. Indeed, nearly abject congressional deference to the military has become all too common. A usual response of politicians when asked about their views on the prosecution of an ongoing conflict is to routinely assert that they will give the generals and admirals whatever they need—hardly a strong affirmation of civilian control of the military. Concerned about the potential political fallout from charges of "not supporting the troops" and lacking requisite knowledge, members tread cautiously before publicly disagreeing with ranking professional soldiers and the strategies that they advocate. I had an opportunity when serving as the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan to witness this reticence first-hand. Visiting members of Congress were generally passive and supportive when receiving briefings from uniformed military leaders. They placed a hefty premium on photo opportunities with troops throughout their visits. On the other hand, they were always skeptical and occasionally confrontational when in similar sessions with the embassy's civilian team in Kabul. Having previously served twice as a military commander in Afghanistan, I could plainly see the contrast. To be clear, I think the congressmen were right to challenge our civilian team; we were spending a significant amount of taxpayers' money, our aims were hard to define, and progress was difficult to measure. Congress's job is to exercise oversight, and members owed their constituents informed judgments. However, by not subjecting the military—which in Afghanistan was consuming over twenty times the amount of funds spent by the civilian team—to the same rigorous standards of scrutiny, these legislators were applying a double-standard and not faithfully executing their constitutional responsibilities. Let me offer a vignette that illustrates the impact of the All-Volunteer Force on Congress's exercise of military oversight. Over the past year, over 50 Coalition (mostly American) soldiers were murdered by their supposed allies in the Afghan National Army and Police in some 35 reported attacks. We could assume that with a draft force, families of those killed would have clamored for congressional hearings, and that Congress would have eventually obliged or perhaps even pre-empted. Yet, during this period, only one congressional hearing has been held on this topic. The session was ninety-five minutes in length, with two civilian Deputy Assistant Secretaries of Defense and two Army brigadier generals (neither serving commanders in the field) representing the Department

of Defense and Armed Forces. The hearing, which received scant media attention, was not exacting in seeking a balance between displays of deferential respect for the military and the exercise of sober, demanding oversight.

The performance of the media, like that of Congress, has been uneven in shining a spotlight on the All-Volunteer Force. I say "uneven" because occasionally excellent press exposés, well-researched books, and analytical think tank reports have led to a tightening of accountability. It might be argued, as well, that the lack of tough media reporting on the military may simply reflect the high standards achieved by the American Armed Forces; perhaps the good news has crowded out the bad. This scenario is implausible, however, given the fantastic amounts of money being spent by our military in chaotic expeditionary environments where efficiencies are impossible to achieve and massive amounts of waste, fraud, and corruption are all but unavoidable. Media interest and focus have diminished over time for several reasons.

First, most media compete in a relentlessly time-constrained news cycle. The loss of access to senior-level military officials is a high-risk business proposition in a combat zone. Hence, reporters will be careful to avoid burning bridges to combatant command headquarters. Add to this fact their need to spend most of their time on the story of the day or week, and it becomes evident why some of the most insightful, frank, and surprising stories about senior military commanders and their strategies often appear only intermittently and are usually published by non-mainstream media outlets and by reporters on special assignments.

Secondly, the decline in resources that many major media outlets devote to investigative journalism has meant, in turn, fewer hard looks at the military, not to mention other subjects of national concern. This decline is especially true given that the armed forces, an all-volunteer organization, elicit less reader or viewer interest than, say, scandals involving domestic politicians or titillating revelations about Hollywood luminaries. Financially strapped major media also attempt to provide "I was there" frontline reporting through the relatively recent innovation of embedding journalists within combat units. For the immediately engaged parties, embedding is a clear win-win; reporters have access to dramatic stories of hardship and heroism and commanders are better able to control the message. However, as journalist and novelist David Ignatius writes:

> But embedding comes at a price. We are observing these wars from just one perspective, not seeing them whole. When you see my byline from Kandahar or Kabul or Basra, you should not think that I am out among ordinary people, asking questions of all sides. I am usually inside an American military bubble. That vantage point has value, but it is hardly a full picture. I fear that an embedded media is becoming the norm, and not just when it comes to war.[12]

Ignatius's argument can be taken even further. The reporter embedded in an all-volunteer unit manned entirely by those concerned about professional reputations and future careers is acquiring less ground truth than he or she might perhaps realize or admit.

Finally, the well-funded Department of Defense and Armed Forces have, over time, developed long-term relationships with various think tanks, analysts, and retired military consultants, whom they periodically ask or encourage to visit theaters of war and to provide assessments. Arrangements in the conflict zone, entirely orchestrated by the military, include logistics, security, travel, and scheduling. Not surprisingly, when the travelers return to the United States, they generally support their sponsor's views in written op-eds and appearances on news shows. What is extraordinary is that although no other government agency has the autonomy or resources to engage in such taxpayer-subsidized self-promotion, the Department of Defense and military have not been taken to task. Again, as ambassador from 2009–2011, I marveled at how Defense Department-sponsored consultants would spend weeks at a time in Afghanistan and often conclude that while the military dimension of the then ongoing surge was generally achieving intended results, it was shortcomings found elsewhere that jeopardized overall mission success. The need for extensive, rigorous, and dispassionate oversight of our armed forces is manifest enough. The expenditures involved are immense, the national security stakes are high, and the potential moral and political degradation associated with warfare is extreme. However, with the connective tissue between the U.S. military and society weakened by the All-Volunteer Force construct, two critically important gatekeepers—Congress and the media—have reduced their vigilance. When a reporter who

has written skillfully on Afghanistan and Pakistan, Dexter Filkins, was asked during an interview on National Public Radio where all the billions spent on the Afghan Army had gone, he replied: "The first is, you know, it's Afghanistan and . . . it's hard to imagine unless you see it, but if you can imagine a place on the moon, trying to build a base on the moon."[13] Whether the U.S. military was manned by volunteers or conscripts, both Congress and the media would be moved to praise the daring and courage required to metaphorically build bases on the moon; however, only with a conscript force might Congress, reinforced by the media, feel compelled to question why they were attempting to do so in the first place.

CONSEQUENCES

If America's foreign policy has become excessively militarized over the past few decades—and I believe it has—and we can identify possible causality—and I think that we reasonably can—I would like to conclude my remarks by posing the question: Is any of this consequential to our republic's future security and political health? I am convinced the answer is "yes" for three reasons.

First, as previously discussed, the great expense and frequent employment of our formidable All-Volunteer Force have become givens within our body politic. The U.S. military, ever versatile and ready to confront new security challenges, has become both the starting and relief pitcher for an ever-increasing number of foreign policy problems. It has not always been this way in the United States, not even during the first full decade of the cold war. As Lesley Gelb has written:

> Truman and Eisenhower carried out their [economic] reforms while holding military spending in check. Pentagon budgets came last, not first. Both presidents allocated defense outlays using the "remainder method," whereby they subtracted necessary domestic spending from tax revenues and gave the leftovers (the "residual," as Eisenhower called it) to defense. . . . [They] were particularly conscious of the ill effects of being a debtor nation.[14]

Yet today, while the domestic implications of our mounting fiscal woes seem evident to most Americans, the long-term impact on our international security standing does not. Our relatively insulated defense spending is rarely included in serious debates about a comprehensive security strategy that must be founded upon economic strength and human capital.

Secondly, to the extent that America has grown comfortable with frequently deploying its superbly trained and equipped troops into harm's way, there have been unintended consequences. Some of you have heard the tale of the knight who returned to the castle after a long, hard day of battle and reported proudly to his king, "Sire, I have been defeating the soldiers and burning the towns of your enemies in the west all day on your behalf." The king, taken aback, exclaimed, "But I have no enemies to the west!" The knight, crestfallen, said, "Well, you do now, Sire!" Sober national assessments about opportunity and reputational costs associated with the use of force have not been sufficiently rigorous in recent decades.

Finally, and perhaps most significant, is the effect that extensive reliance on our military without reference to citizen obligation has had on the civic virtue necessary to sustain a republic. We collectively claim the need for a robust armed forces given the multifaceted threats our country faces, and yet, as individuals, we do not wish to be troubled with any personal responsibility for manning the frontier. The merits of the volunteer force are clear, and few Americans have any desire to return to a draft. Moreover, it may be possible to address certain negative consequences of the All-Volunteer Force through various policy means and approaches separate from reinstating conscription. In fact, given the stakes, we must find a way to deal explicitly with the little-discussed shortcomings of the All-Volunteer Force in an incremental, politically pragmatic fashion. Still, as Beth Bailey has noted at the conclusion of her superb study of our volunteer armed forces: "In a democratic nation, there is something lost when individual liberty is valued over all and the rights and benefits of citizenship become less closely linked to its duties and obligations."[15] As the world's leading power priding itself on a willingness to employ its vast military might in the defense of universal democratic values, there is a truth and irony here that should at least be admitted to.

Note: Ambassador Eikenberry expanded upon the points made during his remarks in an article published in *The Washington Quarterly*, Winter 2012 edition, and in a book on the U.S. military edited by David Kennedy, to be published by Oxford University Press in the summer of 2013.

Notes

1. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1990), 32.
2. Walter Pincus, ''Vast Number of Military Bands May Not Be Music to Gates' Ears,'' *The Washington Post*, August 24, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/08/23/AR2010082304711.html.
3. U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Service Midlevel Gaps Persist Despite Significant Increases in Hiring* (Washington, DC: General Accounting Office, June 2012), 6.
4. Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and the Fall of the Great Powers* (New York: Random House, 1987).
5. Robert Gilpin, *War & Change in World Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
6. *Ibid.*, p. 187.
7. Julian E. Zelizer, *Arsenal of Democracy* (New York: Basic Books, 2010), 235.
8. *The Report of the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1970), 152.
9. *Ibid.*
10. U.S. Office of Management and Budget, *Historical Tables: Budget of the U.S. Government Fiscal Year 2011* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2010), 84, 89, 127, 132, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2011/assets/hist.pdf.
11. Jennifer E. Manning, *Membership of the 112th Congress: A Profile* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, March 1, 2011), 7–8, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41647.pdf.
12. David Ignatius, ''The Dangers of Embedded Journalism in War and Politics,'' *The Washington Post*, May 2, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/30/AR2010043001100.html?sid_/ST2010043001134.
13. Transcript of Terry Gross interview of Dexter Filkins, ''After Troops Leave, What Happens to Afghanistan?,'' National Public Radio, July 10, 2012, http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId_156504634.
14. Lesley Gelb, ''GDP Now Matters More Than Force: A U.S. Foreign Policy for the Age of Economic Power,'' *Foreign Affairs* 89, no. 6 (November–December 2010): 39.
15. Beth Bailey, *America's Army: Making the All-Volunteer Force* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009), 260.